. For a representation tq fi~lIre as a representation in a ('am,11 explanation, it IIImt ol:cur in a conte1(t wherl' it i~ "re.IlI" hy sOllie agent, or~an, or dt'vice. \"h'1t C<.lult!e~tahlish that SUl'h a prOl·t'~~ lX.'l.·lIrs? Consider an obvious cast': old M lit her 1111 hb.u d lie~ dead on the floor, a vidilll of poisoning, an o(X'n and h,llUul1 hottle of paillt relllover in thc t'uplx)llrd. AC<.)lIaintanct'S ~.I~ ,ht had not heen depresscd, hut had complained r('('t'ntly of "hint· ing spIlls." "Aha!" says tIll' ddeclive, noting her thick e~l" gl.I"e3. "The hottle label sa)s 't'UR PH: U~C PAI~T' and ~hl' IIIl"t han' lIIisre.lll il III ~..I)' 'FOil FEELING t.\I/IoT.' See how like Fs tho,t' Ps an' ."
\\'hat l'oul" l'IlIlt'l'i\ .Jhl~ convinct' us that Jdu,ll rule ('tln,ull ,I' lion (K't ur, ill I.,nl.!uagt' processing woult! he 1' \ idt'nce th,11 "11
~<1I1l(, ('X I I ,1m <It 11,11 dy h,1I d .lthllqllill' "" h of ~UPp()) till~ t'\ i· tI"II(,I' : ('\ id"lll·t' ,Ibollt lI1lt jll~t the flllld""1 or operation of th t' rulc~ (..1 \ ~t.I"I('r ~ho\\ ~l , and not cvcn Jbollt jll,t the "ah\tJ ,Ill" forlll uf tI'l' rule, (for, a~ St"hler shows, this cvidcnce is always reinterprdable 01\ cvit:"cc about function), hut about the actual ph) ~ical f(,Jtllres of thl' cncoding and the reading mecha· nisms -not just tIl(' semantics and synta:< of thc lallguagc of thought, hilt its urth()~raphy and typography as well. Could anything less givc us dear evidence in support of 113 over its more mode~t ri\'als? So far as I can sce, nothing else would he direct cvidellce.
TIle trouble is that it IS not dear, givcn Stabler's treatment of the program/data distinction, that even this sort of evidencc would satisfy him . For how could we distinguish, given thi' incredibly strong (imagined) evidence, the altcrnative hypothesis that we had not simply uncovered the typography of the datareprescnting system, 'rathcr than the plOgnlln-rcading system? I am inclined to conclude that there is something fIShy about Stahler's attempt to make that distinctitln, at least as it would have to he aJjush. -d to be transported from computerland to psycholinguistics. Consider another simple case: we teach somebody a simple al&,rithm for perfonning some congitive taslc, such as deciding whether to open the bidding in bridge, or winning at N im. This, then, will be a paradigm case of someone -in this case consciously, even sclf-ronsck>usly -consulting a remembered rule and guiding calculation by its lights, Is it a case in which the rule counts as data -"the rules as argument" -or as program? Perhaps the answer is obvious, but it was not obvious to me "hat Stabler's answer would be, I' Supposing this point clarified somehow, we might return to the que~tion of whether there might be iMinet evidence strongly supporting the el.isten~ of represented rules, Ont' possible line of argument, hinted at but skirted by Stahler, is one form or another of the "you can't get there from here" argument. One might argue, that is, that while "hybrid" and "hardwirt'd" systems are always possible in principle and even, once created, faster and more emdent, they can only he ereall'o "nnturally" by a design process thnt first implements n system in which the rules essential to the "rationale" of the ~ystem's function are explicit, and explicitly consulted. I think this is a rhky and duhious sort of speculation, but its rationale is probably worth exploring, Consider the advanced bridge .player who no longer consciously "counts points" (and who might not be counting them unconsciously either); there is surely some plausibility to the idea that the sophisticated but ex hypothesi merely II 1 rule-describcd behavior of this player could only have been entrained by n process thnt includes an interim stage of 113 rule fullowing. In a similar vein. one could argue that it is no at'Cident that sophistiented hardwired microchips -such as those to be found ill areade video gumes -are designed by a process that begins with a program-guided system in which the operations are debugged. Temptipg as these analogies are, however. they serve in the present context to hig}:llight one of the , most ('Ompelling sorts oClndirect evidence against any 1I3-type theory of human linguistic competence. Surely the evolutionary design process that yields our innate linguistic competence as its product is strongly disanalogous to the design process that yields vidt.,'O games. precise1y in bc!ng undirected, unforcsighted, and completely lacking the sort of explicit "top-down" goal that is the hallmark of design (or training) proc'Csses that arc aided by explicit "rllle~ for beginners." [Sec also Dennett: "llItl'ntional Systems in Cognitive Ethology" 111lS 6(3} 191>3. J
